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Abstract: With the development of Internet of Multimedia Things (IoMT), more and more image data1
is collected by various multimedia devices, such as smart phones, cameras, drones. These massive2
amount of images are widely used in each field of IoMT, which presents substantial challenges for3
privacy preservation. In this paper,we propose a new image privacy protection framework, with an4
effort to protect the sensitive personal information contained in images collected by IoMT devices.5
We aim to use deep neural network techniques to identify the privacy-sensitive content in images,6
and then protect it with synthetic content generated by generative adversarial networks (GANs) with7
differential privacy (DP). Our experimental results show that the proposed framework can effectively8
protect users’ privacy while maintaining image utility.9
Keywords: Internet of Multimedia Things (IoMT), image privacy, object detection, deep learning,10
generative adversarial network.differential privacy11
1. Introduction12
The recent advances in multimedia-recording devices, such as phones, cameras, drones, and other13
type of sensors, have greatly facilitated the collection of multimedia data, especially in the form of14
images and videos. In such an era of IoMT, a massive amount of images are widely used, not only15
by social network personal users but also by government and companies. Image data is the most16
representative type of data in IoMT data collection, which contain sensitive information that might be17
used to dig personal information. Data mining attacks on images can easily cause privacy leakage,18
which can cause serious consequences. The issue of privacy leakage has been paid attention by the19
public in recent years, which has aroused public concern about this issue. Moreover, privacy issues20
are no longer just personal concerns as many countries have launched privacy acts and laws. For21
example, the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect on 25 May 2018 [1]. Any22
violations of the regulation will trigger heavy fines and penalties. GDPR emphasizes the protection23
of “personal data”, interpreting as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural24
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,25
in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data,26
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,27
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person” [2]. According to this definition, images28
include a variety of personal identifiers such as people’s faces, text and license plates. Therefore,29
effective image privacy protection techniques are in urgent need.30
The research community has seen some effort in image privacy protection. The early works mostly31
focus on the access control of the data, i.e., privacy protection by safeguarding against unauthorized32
access. This can be achieved through setting preferences of users [3] [4] or tags control [5] [6]. However,33
these methods cannot be applied to the scenarios where the images are shared openly, but some34
sensitive information needs to be concealed. For example, in the “Google Street View” application,35
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we have full access to photos showing the streets while people’s faces and other personal identifiers36
have been obfuscated, e.g. by blurring. To achieve this, the privacy protection methods need to37
detect, and then cover/remove/replace sensitive content in images. There are some recent research38
in this direction [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]. For example, Viola et al. [7] used a sliding window39
detector to identify and blur the license plates in Google Street View images. Yu et al. [9] used a40
deep multi-task learning algorithm to detect privacy-sensitive objects and provide simple protection41
by blurring. Overall, most of the existing work performs personal data detection as the first step of42
privacy protection. While on the protection part, it mostly relies on simple approaches such as blurring43
or pixelation. Consequently, the image utility suffers to a considerable extent. It not only makes the44
images look unnatural, but also makes the person who looks at the image aware that the obfuscated45
part is private. Moreover, such a protection mechanism is powerless in facing the emerging attacks46
based on advanced deep neural networks. For example, Mcpherson et al. [15] use artificial neural47
networks to recover hidden information from images protected by pixelation, blurring and P3.And the48
method obtained good results on different data sets, MINIST 80%, CIFAR-10 75%,ATT dataset 95%,49
FaceScurb 57%.50
Moreover, the existing methods are almost discussing single object protection,such as face or text.51
However, most images that require privacy protection have multiple objects that need to be protected52
(For example, in street view images, human faces and license plates need to be protected at the same53
time).54
Current methods are unable to find a way to quantify the tradeoff between image usability and55
privacy protection. To tackle this, we use DP to control the image private objects generation to mitigate56
privacy threats.57
To overcome these obstacles, we propose the a three-stage frameworks for image privacy58
protection in this paper. The framework consists of three steps: 1) privacy-sensitive content detection59
and position extraction powered by a deep Convolutional Neural Network: We use CNN networks to60
detect various objects in images and classifying objects into private and non-private ones; 2) real private61
objects projecting into latent space: We use generative adversarial networks(GANs) to projecting the62
real private objects of the images into latent space and get the corresponding latent vector ω. 3) private63
content generation controlled by DP (de-identification): We use Laplace noise into the latent vector64
ω and generated de-identification content. Finally, replace the originally private objects with the65
synthetic ones to protect users’ privacy.66
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed framework, we have conducted extensive67
experiments on a real-world image data set collected by cameras of IoMT, and investigated two types68
of personal identifier related data: license plate and face. We choose these two types of objects as they69
represent the two most significant categories of personal identifiers in images.70
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:71
• We propose an image privacy protection framework that can protect the privacy in the IoMT’s72
image.73
• We propose a GAN-based method to generate the replacement content for private objects in the74
images.75
• We use differential privacy methods to disturb generation to quantify the tradeoff between image76
usability and privacy protection.77
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 378
give the definition and foundation of the methods. Section 4 presents our framework on multimedia79
privacy protection based on Mask-RCNN and synthetic content generation using GANs. Section 580
shows the experimental results of our framework for multi-object privacy protection(street view81
scenarios). Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines the future work.82
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2. RELATED WORK83
Privacy protection, in general, has been extensively studied in recent years. Among all the84
researches, differential privacy (DP) has attracted the most attentions and applied to different85
application. Therefore, in this section, we will review the most relevant research works on image86
privacy and the related fundamental deep learning researches, including: (1) image privacy issue and87
protection; (2) deep learning and object detection of the images; (3) the content generation; (4)and88
privacy protection.89
2.1. Image Privacy Issue and Protection90
The image privacy issue first attracted people’s attention along with the booming of social91
networks developing. The proliferation of social networks generated massive photos flooding on the92
internet that contains sensitive information. For example, Pesce et al. [16] use photo tags to attack93
users and get their privacy. The image privacy issue becomes more server with the widely spread of94
facial recognition systems, as people start to worry that their faces might be used by organizations for95
profiling or social control.96
To combat the image privacy attack, the previous mainstream method is using access control97
on sensitive contents. Mannan et al. [3] use Instant Messaging (IM) networks to control personal98
web content sharing. Vyas et al. [4] use annotation data to predict the privacy preferences of users99
and control the shared content. Wang et al. [5] studied privacy control on Facebook. Moreover,100
Squicciarini et al. [6] proposed collaborative privacy management that can let users collaborative101
control their photos. Similarly, to deal with the privacy issue in facial recognition systems, the current102
countermeasure is simply banning [17]. The access control-based method has several limitations. It103
only gives “Yes” or “No” options for the use of images, while we need to use part of the information in104
applications such as Google Street View. And it can not automate protect privacy based on the privacy105
information of the image itself, requiring human participation.106
Some more recent image privacy researches focus on the inherently implicit information of the107
photos. Tonge et al. [8] explore learning models that can automatically classify the private or public108
parts in an image by using Deep Neural Networks. Yu et al. [9] create a new tool called “iPrivacy” that109
uses a deep learning algorithm to detect the privacy-sensitive objects. Yu’s work can detect the privacy110
parts of photos, but in the step of privacy protection, they just use blur to protect privacy which is111
not good looking. More than blurring, Uittenbogaard’s work [10] set a framework that automatically112
removes moving objects. However, there are two limitations, one only for moving objects and the113
other for missing partial information in the image. Liu’s work [11] proposes a novel Stealth algorithm,114
which makes the automatic detector can not detect the objects in an image. However, human beings115
can easily get privacy information from the image.116
Our framework is a further advancement compared with the researches mentioned above. It can117
identify the privacy part of the photos in the pixel level. Then it will generate the target replacement118
content based on the privacy content, not just using mosaic, blurring or removing to protect privacy.119
Our framework can protect privacy information from both human and machine.120
2.2. Deep Learning-based Image Object Detection and Segmentation121
Object detection and semantic segmentation technologies have been advancing rapidly in recent122
years. In the beginning, Girshick et al. [18] use high-capacity convolutional neural networks (CNNs)123
to bottom-up region proposals, which called R-CNN. This algorithm improves the mean average124
precision (mAP). In 2015, Hariharan et al. [19] define the hypercolumn at a pixel as the vector of125
activations of all CNN units above that pixel to improve the result of the experiment. After that, a126
large part of the research works are based on the Fast R-CNN [20] [21] and Fully Convolution Network127
(FCN) [22]. The disadvantage of Faster R-CNN is that it cannot deal with pixel-to-pixel alignment128
between the inputs and outputs of the network. To solve this problem, He et al. proposed a method129
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called Mask R-CNN [23] that extends the Fast R-CNN by adding predicting segmentation masks on130
each Region of Interest (RoI) to get the results. As our goal is to find the privacy part of the images, so131
we choose to use the Mask R-CNN to get the instance segmentation results that can be used as the132
basis for the follow-up privacy content detection and positioning. To obtain good results for our use133
case, we need to re-train the network using our image dataset that includes more privacy sensitive134
contents.135
2.3. GAN-based Content Generation136
Preliminary ways for image privacy content protection include blurring, deletion, etc. In this paper,137
we use the replacement of content to protect privacy, i.e. generating content without identification138
information to replace the privacy content in the images. Traditional content generation methods139
such as [24] [25] [26] [27] just fill the pixels by matching and pasting based on the low-level features140
in the images. The effect is not very satisfactory as they often produce the failure contents and the141
results obtained are also not good. In 2014, Goodfellow proposed a new framework called GAN [28]142
can synthesize new content by training the models. Following the GAN-based method, the latest143
GAN-based generation content generation technology can generate very realistic content, such as faces,144
cats, dogs, even Airbnb rooms [29] [30] [31] [32]. In our framework, we use StyleGAN [33] to generate145
the replacement content. The StyleGAN can generate content which is not much different from the146
real image. The image content generated by StyleGAN does not exist in real life and these contents can147
avoid copyright disputes. With the replacement of the generated content, the privacy of the images148
can be protected.149
2.4. Privacy Protection150
In the traditional privacy protection technology, one of the most common method is data151
encryption, which has high security. However directly encrypted and decrypted on large-scale data152
such as image sets will consume a lot of computing resources. Another privacy protection methods is153
anonymity privacy protection technology. In 2002, Sweeney et al. proposed k-Anonymity[34] method154
to protect privacy.Machanavajjhala proposed l-Diversity[35] to address the limitations of k-Anonymity,155
and Li et al. introduced t-Closeness[36]. However, with the development of attack technology, attackers156
can use data mining, machine learning, background knowledge attack, and big data analysis to obtain157
enough useful information of the privacy. To solve this problem, Dwork[37] proposed the concept of158
differential privacy which has a solid mathematical theoretical foundation. Once differential privacy is159
proposed, it has attracted attention in the field of privacy protection, and various privacy protection160
algorithms based on differential privacy have been proposed. In this paper, we propose a new image161
privacy protection method based on the differential privacy method combined with GANs. Take162
advantage of the controllability of differential privacy, our method can protect the privacy of IoMT163
images with high controllability.164
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3. Preliminaries165
3.1. Privacy Protection and Image Utility166
Figure 1. The four levels of image privacy risks.
In this part, we discuss the image privacy protection and image utility. Firstly, the different167
levels of image privacy risk are shown in Fig. 1. On the left is images that do not contain any168
private information (such as a landscape photograph) and the risk of privacy leakage is zero. On169
the right is images that contain private information and can be linked to specific individuals which170
violates individuals’ privacy directly. Between the two extreme cases are images that contain private171
information but might not leak individuals privacy. Our goal is to propose a framework to reduce the172
risk of privacy leak from Level 3/4 back to Level 2 in Fig. 1. It means that we can protect privacy in173
images so that they cannot be linked to any individual.174
However, the strength of privacy protection will affect the utility of images. The common methods175
such as mosaic and blur, might reduce the utility of the image while image processing. The greater176
privacy protection, will result in lower utility of images, example shown in Fig. 2. Although mosaic or177
blur methods protect the privacy, it reduces the readability and usability of the images. It also make178
images sharing pointless. In our image privacy protection framework, we found an effective way to179
compromise between privacy protection and image utility.180
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Figure 2. The privacy and utility.
3.2. Formulation of Image De-Identification181
We now formally define the problem of image de-identification. This part help us to define the182
problem we need to deal with and build the foundation for following discussions.183
Definition 3.1. (Image). An image is a matrix I of m columns, n rows and c channels. The c184
channels usually is 3 in common color space such as RGB and YUV. Each cell in matrix I contains a185
coding which ranging from 0 to 255. Image should contains multi private objects such as face or text.186
187
Definition 3.2. (Object sets). An object set is a set of M objects images contained in image matrix188
I: Oi : i = 1, 2, ..., M.189
190
Definition 3.3. (Privacy object sets). A private object set is a set of N objects images contained in191
image matrix I:Pi : i = 1, 2, ..., N. Which Pi ∈ Oi and N ≤ M.192
193
Definition 3.4. (Privacy Object De-Identification Function). Let P and Pd be a private object set
and de-identification object set.
f : P −→ Pd (1)
f is defined de-identification function for each P to remove their identity.194
195
Definition 3.5. (Image De-Identification). Given image matrix I and de-identification function
f , for each private object Pi ∈ Oi:
Id = f (I) (2)
which we can use de-identification function to get an image matrix Id not contain privacy.196
3.3. Differential Privacy197
Definition 3.6. (Differential Privacy). The formal definition of DP is given by (3):
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] (3)
Definition 3.7. (The Sensitivity of Differential Privacy ). The sensitivity of DP is defined in (4),
which determines how much perturbation is required in the DP mechanism.
Δ f = max
D1,D2
|| f (D1)− f (D2)||1 (4)
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4. Image De-identification Framework198
Figure 3. The diagram of the proposed image de-identification (DE-ID) framework.
In order to achieve the above goal of image privacy protection, we propose an image199
de-identification framework consists of three steps: (a) objects detection and private objects extraction;200
(b) de-identification content generation; and (c) content replacement and image privacy protection.201
Fig. 3 shows the diagram of the framework. The original image X contains privacy information202
such as face and car plate. It is first input into a CNN to identify and extract the private objects in the203
image. Then we transform the extracted private objects into latent space and use differential privacy204
to control the de-identified content generation. Finally, we get a de-identified image X′, i.e., image205
without any sensitive information. In the following part of this section, we will explain the framework206
in details.207
4.1. Step-I:objects detection and private objects extraction208
To protect the privacy of an image, it is necessary to detect the sensitive privacy zone in the209
image. We use two steps to achieve this target. First, all objects in the image are detected, and then the210
included private objects are extracted.211
4.1.1. Objects detection212
The state-of-the-art object detection algorithm Mask-RCNN is used to detect the objects in the213
image.214
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For an image I, the ROI (region of interest) vector Xroi of each object Oi can be detected by R(·):215




x1 y1 w1 h1 p11 p12 . . . p1m









xn yn wn hn pn1 pn2 . . . pnm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, (5)
where Pn = (xn, yn, wn, hn) is position vector including the information of up left corner coordinate216
(xi, yi), width wi and height hi of object Oi. The probability of objects noted as Ep, the Epi is the217
probability of Object Oi belonging to the mth class (there are m class objects in the image I).218
In (5), we choose the maximum probability ci in each Epi, so the output of the object detection
shown as blew:
Xc = (P|Cp) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
xp1 yp1 wp1 hp1 c1






xpn ypn wpn hpn cn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, (6)
where ∀i ∈ (1, n) :219
ci =
{
arg max(pij), 1 ≤ j ≤ m; if max(pij) > δ
cbg, if max(pij) ≤ δ
.220
In Mask-RCNN, if the maximum probability is smaller than a thresholdδ, this object will be221
treated as the background class, otherwise the object belongs to class i.222
4.1.2. Private Objects extraction223
After getting the objects’ information and position, we set a classifier to classify the objects as224
either private of non-private. In our the street View experiment scene, the private objects can be human225
face, car plates, etc. The non-private objects can be as background, tree, traffic lights.226
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⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠. (7)
So we got the private objects’ position, class, and pixel information. The private objects’228
information is represented as follows:229
X i = D(P|Cp) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
xp1 yp1 wp1 hp1 cp1






xpα ypα wpα hpα cpα
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (8)
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4.2. STEP-II: De-identification content generation230
In the second step, we use a content generator G(·) and the differential privacy method to generate231
the de-identification content. The algorithm shown as below:232
Algorithm 1: Image De-identification Content Generation
Input: The original image I ∈ n×m×3 to de-identify; A pre-trained generator G(·).
Output: The de-identified image Ide optimized via G(·)
Initialize latent vector ω, differential privacy Laplace noise with Δ f and ε;
while not converged do
I  I′ = G(ω∗);
end
Ide = G(ω∗ + Lap(
Δ f
ε )) ;
Firstly, we find the latent vector ω∗ of each input image I. Initialize a latent vector ω and search
for a optimized vector ω∗ minimizes the loss function (9) that measures the similarity between the
private object image and image generated by latent vector ω∗. This step enables the image editable.
ω∗ = arg min
ω
Lpercept(G(ω∗), I) + λmseN ||G(ω
∗)− I||22, (9)
where image I ∈ n×m×3 is the input privacy image. G() is the pre-trained generator, N is the number233
of scalars in the image, ω is the latent code to optimize, λmse = 1.234
Secondly, after we got latent vector ω∗ of each private objects, we put the Laplace noise on latent235
vector ω∗. Then put the new latent vector into the generator G(·) and got the de-identify content.236




In equation (10), we used the DP criterion to protect the sensitivity information of the image. The
Laplace mechanism was used. Generally speaking, the Laplace mechanism adds a controlled Laplace
noise to a query result before returning it to the user. Here, the Laplace noise is sampled from a Laplace







To sum up, the Laplace mechanism can be summarized as





The Laplace mechanism in (12) indicates that the size of the Laplace noise is related to the237
sensitivity of query f and the privacy budget ε. A larger sensitivity leads to a higher noise. In our238
method, we use privacy budget ε to control our GAN generator to generate the synthetic de-identify239
content.240
4.3. STEP-III: De-identification content replacement241
After de-identification contents generated, we use the generated content to replace the original242
private object images. The algorithm is shown in ??.243
Finally, we get the de-identified image Ide.244
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Algorithm 2: Image Protected by de-identification content swapping
Input: The original image I ∈ n×m×3 contains private content Xi, i = 1, 2, ..., N;
de-identified contents in the image: Xdei , i = 1, 2, ..., N
Output: The protected image Id ∈ n×m×3







5. Experiments and Discussions245
5.1. Experiment Setup246
First of all, we set up an experiment database contains amount of street view images collected by247
IoMT technology. The street view images contains human faces, car license plates, road signs, traffic248
lights and more. In these images, the sensitive private information are human faces and car license249
plates. In our test database, the human faces and car plates are the private objects, and the road sign,250
the traffic light and background are the non-private objects. We use the camera to collect over 4000251
typical street view images as the test database.252
5.2. Performance Evaluation Metrics253
5.2.1. Privacy metrics254
Confidence Score. In the privacy protection metric for human face, we use the open-source "face255
recognition" platform to evaluate the confidence in face privacy. This platform was built using dlib’s256
state-of-the-art face recognition which was built with deep learning. The model has an accuracy of257
99.38% on the Labeled Faces in the Wild benchmark. The output of the platform is the facial distance258
between each unrecognized face and the recognized face. By setting the corresponding threshold, the259
distance metric can judge whether the face is protected. This means after the face photo is processed260
by our method, whether the general third-party platform still considers the same person. The default261
threshold is 0.3.262
Distance. In the privacy protection metric for the car license plate, due to the license plate is a set263
of characters, we believe that the distance between the original license plate and the processed license264
plate is the privacy metric. In the experiment, we set the threshold of the car license plate for 3. This265
means that the sensitive information of the license plates is protected when the distance is greater than266
3.267
5.2.2. Image utility metrics268
The quantitative judgment is necessary for the degree of modification between the original image269
and the protected image. So we use several metrics to calculate the degree of modification, these270
metrics include L0, L2, ALDp, Structural similarity index(SSIM), and difference value hash(Dhash).271
Deciding there are two images: processed image Xa and original image X, the utility image metrics272
are:273
The L0 calculate the number of pixels changed.
L0 = num(Xa, X) (13)
where num is calculated the number of pixels changed between Xa and X.274
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The L2 calculate Euclidean distance between the original image and protected image.
L2 = ||Xa − X||2 =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(Xai − Xi)2 (14)

















SSIM(Xai , Xi) (16)
The Dhash use the difference hash to evaluate the degree of modification which value is the smaller
the better.
Dhash(Xa, X) = hash(Xa)− hash(X) (17)
5.3. Street view image protection275
5.3.1. Human face privacy protection276
Human face is the most sensitivity information of the IoMT images, which can straight leak277
personal identification. Therefore, we use our method to protect the human face privacy in the street278
view experimental scene. Firstly, we use Mask-RCNN to extra the human face images I from the279
experimental street view images. Secondly, initialize a latent vector ω and use the loss function (18) to280
find the latent vector ω∗ of human face I. The algorithm to find the latent vector ω∗ was shown in281
algorithm (3).282
Algorithm 3: Human face Image Projecting into Latent Space
Input: A human face image I ∈ n×m×3 to project; a pre-trained generator G(·)
Output: The latent code ω∗ and the projected image G(ω∗) optimized via F′
Initialize latent code ω∗ = ω
while not converged do
L ← Lprecept(G(ω∗), I) + λN ||G(ω∗)− I||22
ω∗ ← ω∗ − ηF′(ω L)
end
283
In algorithm (3), the loss function was show in (18).




where image I ∈ n×m×3 is the input privacy image. G() is the pre-trained generator, N is the number
of scalars in the image,ω is the latent code to optimize,λmse = 1. For the loss term Lpercept, shows as
below:







where I1, I2 ∈ n×m×3 are the input images, Fj is the feature output of VGG-16 layers conv1_1,284
conv1_2,conv3_2,conv4_2.Nj is the number of scalars in the jth layer output,λj = 1 for all js are285
empirically obtained for good performance.286
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Fig. 4 is an example of the original human face image and the human face generated by GAN287
with no modify.288
Figure 4. The original face image projecting into StyleGAN
Thirdly, put the Laplace noise on the latent vector ω∗ and use the generator G(·) to generate the
de-identify human face image.




Finally, use the de-identify human face image to swap the original human face image. In this step,289
we use Dlib, which is a toolbox in Opencv based on key-point face detection, to get the 68 key points of290
the human faces and use seamless cloning to swap the face. The face swapping algorithm can transfer291
the input face features to the target face without obtrusive. An example result is shown in Fig.5 (d).292
Intuitively speaking, a larger Laplace noise leads to a more different human face compared with the293
original human face.294
In our experiments, we use Laplace noise parameter ε to control the distance between de-identify295
human face images and private human face images. In addition, we use the open-source "face296
recognition" platform to determine if the synthetic face and the original face represent the same person.297
Figure 5. Face images comparison: A) Face in street view, B) Mosaic methods, C) Blur method, D) Our
method
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Fig.5 shows the original private face, the mosaic face, the blurred face, the the new face generated298
by StyleGAN. It can be seen that it is not easy for both human and machine to recognize the de-identify299
generated face image Fig.5 D as Fig.5 A.300
5.3.2. Car license plate privacy protection301
The car license plates are another kind of sensitive objects of IoMT images. As for the privacy302
protection of the car license plates, we use Chinese car license plates as our experimental objects. The303
car plate should be generated according to the rules enforced by the vehicle management authority. The304
rules of a valid Chinese car license plate are: 1) the first character is a Chinese character, representing a305
province; 2) the second symbol is an English letter; 3) the last five symbols forms a random string of306
letters and numbers, and 4) the background of a license plate is dark blue.307
After getting the car license plates images from the street images, we use OCR to recognize308
the characters and symbols of the car license plates, and then map the car plate into a sequence309
of numbers. According to the Chinese car plate rules, the first character will be one of 31 Chinese310
province abbreviation characters (except special district). Because of the first Chinese character311
represents location information, we map them into 2-digit numbers 00-30 based on the sorted distances312
from each province to the capital city Beijing. The mapping table for the first character is shown in313
Table ??.314
Next, the numerical values 0-9 will be translated into 2-digit codes 00-09, and the English symbols315
will be translated into 2-digit codes 10-33. For example, a car plate "Beijing A132B3" will be mapped316
to a sequence of numbers "00 100103021103". After we translate each car plate into a sequence of317
numbers, we add Laplace noise onto the number sequence and obtain a synthetic number sequence318
satisfying DP. In Laplace noise generate, we let the Δ f = 1 and control the ε to generate the Laplace319
noise. For example, if we add a random Laplace noise on the above car plate "00 100103021103", and320
obtain a perturbed sequence as "03 130214231502", which can be translated to a synthetic car plate321
"Hebei D2ENF2". The above example is illustrated in Fig.6. And there is a cyclic shifting if the Laplace322
noise makes the value out of the bounds, e.g. the province code > 33.323
Then, we use the generator to generate a synthetic car plate image according to the car plate code.324
Finally, we swap the car plate with the synthetic car plate image. The synthetic car plate is protected325
by the DP criterion.326
Figure 6. A new car plate content created by DP
In the car number transfer, the larger the noise, the longer distance(original car number as origin)327
car number will be generated. For example, if a province name is Jilin in a car plate, the province codes328
should be generated for Jilin based on the distance from the other provinces to Jilin.329
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Our method uses the synthetic DP car plate to protect the private car plate information. As shown330
in Fig. 7, we can see that the car plate is smoothly replaced by our the synthetic car plate.331
Figure 7. A typical Chinese car plate swap to protect the street view image
It is very important to note that the replacement of the privacy content in a image is not simply a332
copy-and-paste job. Instead, it needs to transform the synthetic content by generator into an image333
that fits into the original image area with a correct orientation.334
Therefore, the synthetic image is generally not perceptible to human eyes.335
5.4. Performance Evaluation336
5.4.1. Privacy protection metrics337
In this part, we calculate the distance between the original private image and protected image to338
measure the degree of privacy protection.339
In human face, the average facial distance between the same person is 0.12,which confidence340
score is 88. After using our method processed, the average facial distance is 0.45 and confidence score341
is 55, which is over the threshold of confidence score 70. This experiment result means our method can342
remove the identity of the human face, which means our method can protect the privacy of the human343
face image.344
In car license plate, because of the license plates are strings, their distances are integers. In the345
experiment, the distance between the same license plate is 0. After using our method processed, the346
distance is 3, which we can consider that the sensitive information of the license plate is protected.347
5.4.2. Image utility metrics348
In this part, we set an automatic evaluate module to calculate the degree of image modification349
by different metrics through L0, L2, ALDp, SSIM, and Dhash. We compare our method with the Blur350
and Mosaic methods. As shown in Fig 8, the Blur and Mosaic remove the sensitive area of privacy.351
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However, a human can easily notice the blur and mosaic in the image. Hence, the computer can easily352
recover the information from the processed image.[38][39][40]353
In our method, we control the generator to generate the de-identify content image with DP354
Laplace noise. The de-identify images make both human eyes and computer vision detection methods355
not easily to see the difference and get the privacy information on sensitive private objects. The result356
of the street view image shown in Fig. 8, as we can see, human and computer can easily detect the357
sensitive information in unprotected street view image in Fig. 8 A). And in Fig. 8 B) and 8 C), the358
algorithm can not detect the face and the car plate after being blurred, but human can easily see359
there are blur or mosaic in the image. In Fig.8 D), the computer algorithm and human detect the fake360
sensitive information which had already swapped by our method, so both human and computer can361
not get the real sensitive information of the face and the car plate. The privacy in the image is protected362
under our method.363
Figure 8. The result of 4 street view image: A) unprotected image, B) image processed with blur, C)
image processed with mosaic, D) image processed with our method
Next, we use metrics to evaluate the efforts of our methods. Table 1 shows the performance of364
our method, blur, and mosaic. The metrics are DHash, SSIM, L0, L2 and ALDp. The blur and Mosaic365
have been modified to change the sensitive area in our experiment images.366
First, compared with other methods, our methods change the minim pixels to protect the privacy367
part of the image. In Dhash, Our method is better than the others. Compared with blur and mosaic,368
our method decreases 95.02% and 95.2%. In SSIM, our method is better than others in 1.17% and 1.67%.369
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In L0, Our method decreases 73.6% and 72.97%. In L2, 86.25% and 25.99%. In ALDp, our method is370
higher than blur and mosaic, which is 160.65% and 98.85%. It is shown that our method is better than371
the other two methods in the SSIM, Dhash and L0. However, the results show that in the L2 and ALDp,372
our method is not the best. After analysis, we found that the L2 and ALDp are more suitable in big373
area modification. These metrics are not sensitive to minor modifications. So we use the face swap as374
an example to show the metrics in the minor modification in a small area. So we choose 89 face swap375
images to analysis, the result shows in Table 2. In Dhash, compared with blur and mosaic decreases376
96.68% and 96.97%. In SSIM, increase 50.67% and 102.24%. In the L0, decrease 76.55% and 76.84%. In377
L2, decrease 64.93% and 81.08%. In ALDp, decrease 65.11% and 79.68%. As we can see, our method is378
the best in all metrics.379
Table 1. Average result of 4000 images with the metrics: Dhash, SSIM, L0, L2, ALDp
Methods Original Blur Mosaic Our methods
Dhash 0 12873.65 13370.19 641.71
SSIM(10−2) 100 98.18 97.70 99.33
L0(102) 0 1692.25 1652.57 446.74
L2 0 9983.06 14757.19 18593.41
ALDp(10−2) 0 3.99 5.23 10.4
6. Conclusion380
This paper proposes a new image privacy protection method based on GAN and DP. Our method381
can protect the sensitive private information contained in the images of IoMT. We use the deep neural382
network to identify the private data in the images and de-identified it with the GAN-based content.383
Compared with traditional blur or mosaic methods, the proposed method can protect the sensitive384
information of image data, avoid the privacy leakage. The experimental results of IoMT collection385
image data show that our privacy protection method can protect the privacy with high efficient and386
controlabilty. In future work, we will study the privacy protection on video of IoMT and improve the387
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